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Abstract
It is well recognized that the impact of subsidization/taxation policies hinges on the market
stru cture to which they apply. We show that diﬀerent degree of eﬃciency gain sharply changes
the comparisons of optimal subsidy, total outputs and social welfare between mixed and private
duopoly. What is more, for an imposition of an optimal subsidy, welfare may increase,
decrease, or remain unchanged with privatization, which depends on the level of the cost
eﬃciency gap and the taxation burden. However, it may be possible to raise welfare through
privatization as longas the e ﬃciency gain prevails or no excess taxation burden exists.
Government sets higher subsidy to stimulate ﬁrmsʼ production if the value of cost-diﬀerential is
assured.
Keywords: Privatization; Mixed Duopoly; Cost Eﬃciency Gap; Subsidization; Excess Taxation
Burden
JEL Classiﬁcation: L13, L33, H20
I. Introduction
Privatization is beinga surg ingwave amongthe transition economy and ﬂedged markets.
In such transition countries, governments carry out privatization policy for market eﬃciency,
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1 Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) described a privatization procedure which implements eﬃcient allocation andsuch as East Europe, Latin America, and so called BRICs -Brazil, Russia, India and China. As
we observed, wide features of industry involve this issue, which includes the airline, rail,
telecommunications, electricity, energy and so on. For instance, China adopts privatization
policy to reform its state-owned enterprises since 1978.
2 And duringthe 1980s, Brazil and
other Latin American countries evolve into the “Washington consensus”, and then attempt to
implement couple of sophisticated anti-inﬂation policies with a growth strategy based on market
liberalization, such as privatization.
Over the past few decades, proliferated theoretical literatures involve the exploration of
privatization. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) in a mixed oligopoly model showed that the
privatization of welfare-maximizingpublic ﬁrms may improve social welfare. Bös (1997)
presented a theory of incomplete privatization contracts to postulate an elaborate system of
price reg ulation of privatized monopolies, which typically is missingin developingcountries.
Matsumura (1998) and Bennett and Maw (2003) explicitly considered the possibility of partial
privatization. Alongwith the extension of free-entry market, Matsumura and Kanda (2005)
assessed the welfare implications of partial privatization in a homogeneous oligopoly. Brandão
and Castro (2007) demonstrated that the presence of a public enterprise can be an alternative to
direct regulation to avoid the excess entry problem. Integrating the past relevant literatures,
Wang and Chen (2010) highlighted the importance of cost eﬃciency gap between public and
private ﬁrm, and showed the relation of cost eﬃciency gap and foreign competition with
optimal privatization at free entry market.
Recently, the World Bank has urged India to make more far-reaching reforms to raise the
current low collection rate of user charges. In particular, privatization in power and subsidies
adjustment must be done if it is to free itself from what is known as the “Hindu loop” (growth
rates of around 5-6 percent). In fact, India requires much higher growth rates through such
reforms if it is to alleviate the livingconditions of some 300 million livingbelow the poverty
line. Studies on optimal subsidy in mixed oligopoly have gained attentions.
3 White (1996)
showed that the same subsidy rate yields the ﬁrst-best outcome in both mixed and private
oligopoly in his Cournot setting (irrelevance result). A series of papers demonstrated that there
are no consequences from privatization in a mixed oligopoly when the government uses a
subsidy to ensure ﬁrst best. Fjell and Heywood (2004) obtained the relevance result of
privatization, and depicted if instead privatization results in a public leader becominga private
leader, the optimal subsidy, output and welfare are all reduced. Other correlated papers included
that Tomaru (2006) utilized partial privatization setting, Kato and Tomaru (2007) incorporated
various objective functions of private ﬁrms, and Hashimzade et al. (2007) considered product
diﬀerentiation. Matsumura and Tomaru (2009) considered excess tax burden in mixed duopoly
and examined the optimal subsidy policy. They demonstrated that privatization aﬀects both the
optimal subsidy rate and the resultingwelfare. In their paper, they ig nored the cost e ﬃciency
gap between public ﬁrm and private ﬁrm in their setting. Tomaru and Saito (2010) took
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demonstrate that a privatized ﬁrm should always be at least as eﬃcient as a public ﬁrm. Furthermore, many empirical
observations have shown that public ﬁrms in many developingcountries are run less e ﬃciently than private ﬁrms. See
such relevant discussions and surveys, e.g. Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Megginson and Netter (2001), Gouret (2007),
and Bai et al. (2009).
2 See Li (1997), Jeﬀerson and Su (2006), and Bai et al. (2009) for careful survey and demonstrations.
3 Apparently, the issue of privatization and subsidy is beingdiscussed widely, not only in economics, but also in law.
See, e.g. Diamond (2008).account into the endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with subsidization.
As we observed, in the real world, public ﬁrm often undertakes the policy burden from the
g overnment, such as retainingredundant workers or providingsocial g oods as corporate social
responsibility. Lin et al. (1998) took China for example to indicate that most ﬁrms in a
transition economy carry many types of policy burdens, inherited from the pre-transition
system. Lin and Tan (1999) showed that the policy burden causes the loss of public ﬁrm, which
results in the phenomenon of soft budget constraint (SBC). Lin and Li (2008) proposed a new
explanation for the pervasive syndromes of SBC, and stated that when a public ﬁrm suﬀers the
policy burden, privatization deteriorates SBC problem.
In this paper, we do not focus on the SBC problem. What interests us is that in the
presence of excess policy burden, how does the authority make the industrial policy-
subsidization/taxation? As one of essential viewpoint provided in Meade (1944), the optimal
policy could be determined by the outputs equality/inequality. Notice that in mixed oligopoly,
cost-diﬀerential and diﬀerent objective function faced by each ﬁrm leads to output inequality
while all representative consumers have the identical utility and they are risk-neutral. Therefore,
in the presence of excess policy burden, it is interestingto explore how the optimal policy is
aﬀected by the cost-diﬀerential and diﬀerent objective function. Due to no exploration for
information sharingissue, we assume cost for any one in this g ame is observed. As the
framework shown in Laﬀont and Tirole (1986), the ﬁrm knows its eﬃciency before contracting.
After contracting, it chooses an output, which together with an eﬃciency-diﬀerential among
each ﬁrm. Accordingly, integrating the framework of Meade (1944), Laﬀont and Tirole (1986),
White (1996) and Wangand Chen (2010), we utilize simple mixed duopoly model with cost
eﬃciency gap to explore optimal subsidy/tax. We show that diﬀerent degree of eﬃciency gain
sharply changes the comparisons of optimal subsidy, total outputs and social welfare between
mixed and private duopoly. What is more, for an imposition of an optimal subsidy, welfare
may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged with privatization, which depends on the level of
the cost eﬃciency gap and the taxation burden. However, it may be possible to raise welfare
through privatization as long as the eﬃciency gain prevails or no excess taxation burden exists.
Government sets higher subsidy to stimulate ﬁrmsʼ production if the value of cost-diﬀerential is
assured.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We outline the basic frameworks in
section II; and then compute optimal results of mixed duopoly and private duopoly in section
III. Section IV is the comparisons of equilibrium outcomes and concludingremarks is provided
in section V.
II. Basic Frameworks
We consider that in a closed duopoly market one public ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0) competes with one
private ﬁrms (ﬁrm 1) as well as all ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good. With the utility
function, U=a(q0+q1),(q0+q1)
2C2+I, where I is the composite good, the inverse demand
function could be expressed as P=a,Q, where Q=q0+q1; and then total consumer surplus is
given by CS=(q0+q1)
2C2. Notice that the existence of the eﬃciency gap between public and
private ﬁrm induces to asymmetric costs.
4 FollowingWang et al. (2009) and Wangand Chen
(2010), we assume that the cost function of public ﬁrm and private ﬁrm is




1C2 respectively, while the ﬁxed cost f is assumed to be zero
for simplicity. Note that the assumption gB1 means that there is an eﬃciency gap between the
public ﬁrm and private ﬁrm, namely, private ﬁrm has more cost eﬃciency than public ﬁrm.
When g=1, the eﬃciency of public ﬁrm is conformed with private one. We assume that
privatization leads an eﬃciency gain as reduction in production cost of the public ﬁrm in mixed
duopoly. Further, it is worthwhile to mentioned why we use a linearly increasingmarg inal cost
function for a non-positive C". As Matsumura and Kanda (2005) indicated, C">0 induces the
U-shaped average cost curve when ﬁxed cost is positive. This manipulation avoids a monopoly
by the public ﬁrm while the public ﬁrm is as eﬃcient as a private ﬁrm.
The government sets s (the unit subsidy rate) for two ﬁrms. Given the cost function and











The government ﬁnances the speciﬁc subsidies for the two ﬁrms by taxation with excess
burden; meanwhile, in this paper we assume that only public ﬁrm whose objective function is
welfare-maximizingbears policy burden. According ly, social welfare W as in Matsumura and
Tomaru (2009) is given by,
W(q0, q1, l, s)=CS+p1(q1, q0, s),(1+l)[sQ,p0(q0, q1, s)], (2)
where l [0, 1] represents the unit excess burden. The subsidy payment for the two ﬁrms is
sQ, but the proﬁts of the public ﬁrm would comprise a part of this payment. Thus the social
cost for ﬁnancingthe subsidy payment is g iven by (1 +l)(sQ,p0).
In mixed duopoly scenario, the public ﬁrm selects its output in order to maximize social
welfare, while the private ﬁrm chooses its output in order to maximize its own proﬁti nt h e
second stage. Otherwise, in pure duopoly, both privatized and private ﬁrm decide optimal
output for maximizingits own pro ﬁt .A n dt h e ni nt h eﬁrst stage, the authority levies optimal
subsidy rate for welfare maximum. Note that in this paper, we assume no agency problem
existing in the mixed oligopoly. Furthermore, this two-stage game leads players to obtain
payoﬀs once. Therefore, we could ignore discount rates for simplicity but without the loss of
generality. The method of backward induction is utilized to solve equilibrium outcomes.
III. Primary Outcomes
In this section, we compute optimal results of mixed duopoly in subsection III.1, and
private duopoly in subsection III.2, respectively.
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4 Couple of empirical evidences point out that public ﬁrm is more ineﬃcient than private one. See, e.g., La Porta and
Lopez-de-Silane (1999), Aizenman (2000), Warzynski (2003), and Nishiyama and Smetters (2007). It is worthwhile to
mention Vickers and Yarrow (1991) who stressed that through ownership rearrangement and the change of the
competitive structure of the industry from the privatization process, eﬃciency gap could be improved.1. Mixed Duopoly
First, we consider mixed duopoly scenario. After observingunit subsidy rate, s, public ﬁrm
chooses its output to maximize social welfare; and private ﬁrm chooses its output to maximize






An increase in s directly raises q1, but it reduces q0 through strategic interaction. An
increase in l directly increases q1, but decreases q0 through strategic interaction as well. Not
surprisingly, as in White (1996), a private ﬁrmʼs output is positively related to the subsidy,
whereas a public ﬁrmʼs output is negatively related to the subsidy. Through indirect eﬀect, an
increase in subsidy reduces a public ﬁrmʼs output while it raises private ﬁrmʼs output. Turning










The superscript ʻMDʼ denotes the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome in a
mixed duopoly.
Lemma 1.G i v e ns
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2(1+l) . Explicitly, g
* ismonotonically increas ing






1 B0i f1 CgCg
*.
The reason is that the objective of the public ﬁrm iswelfare-enhancing. An increas ing in
output diminishes price, while consumer surplus raises. Note that l=0, g
*=1. When l=0, the




1. Thisimpliesthat q0=q1 in the case of the




1. When l>0, thisoutcome
isnot optimal. The larger (s maller) output of ﬁrm 0 (ﬁrm 1) economizes the shadow cost of
public funding and s is set to induce such an outcome.
2. Private Duopoly
Next, we consider the private duopoly. Firm 0 is privatized, and the eﬃciency of
privatized ﬁrm isconformed with private one
5, namely g=1. Both ﬁrmschoos e their outputs




After privatizing, the welfare isgiven by,
W(q0, q1, l, s)=CS+[p0(q0, q1, s),V]+p1(q1, q0, s),(1+l)[sQ,V], (6)
where V is the revenue from selling the stocks of public ﬁrm 0. While the public ﬁrm is
privatized, an owner buysthe public ﬁrm at price V.S i n c ep0 doesnot include the payment for
government, V, the payoﬀ of the owner isapparently identical to the pro ﬁt from the operation
of the privatized ﬁrm minusthe payment for government, i.e. p0,V.
Substituting (5) into (6) and maximizing it with respect to s yields,
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5 This assumption is usually employed in mixed oligopoly literature to avoid a trivial solution. See also Bárcena-
Ruiz and Garzón (2005). Some empirical evidences, nevertheless, indicate the superior eﬃciency of private ﬁrms
relative to comparable publicly-owned ﬁrms(Mueller, 1989; Vining and Boardman, 1992), and the improvement in




The superscript ʻPDʼ denotes the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome in a
private duopoly.
Lemma 3.G i v e ns

























0 , where q [0, 1] is the revenue loss during the privatization process such as
bureaucratic corruption and managerial ineﬃciency.
6 For simplicity without the loss of
generalization, we assume that the ﬁnancial market hasno agency problem, that is , q=0.
Substituting V=p
PD








IV. Comparisons of Equilibrium Outcomes
Comparing the optimal rates obtained in mixed and private duopoly cases, we obtain the
relevance result, that is, s
MD4s




3+6g . As we can see that given the cost ineﬃciency, the subsidy rate in mixed duopoly is
larger than in private duopoly, which casts doubt on the proposition 4 obtained by White
(1996) who did not consider the speciﬁc a t i o no fc o sti n e ﬃciency, he stated that when optimal
subsidies are used before and after privatization of a public ﬁrm in a mixed oligopoly, the
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6 Bjorvatn and Søreide (2005) analyzed the relation between corruption and privatization. See also, Clarke and Xu
(2002) for privatization and corruption issue. On the other hand, Lee and Hwang (2003) allowed managerial
ineﬃciency in a mixed duopoly in the presence of partial privatized ﬁrm. See also Heywood and Ye (2009) for agency
problem.Note that l=0, g
**=1. g
** isa non- monotonic function with res pect to l.
In Region 1 (2) of Figure 2, s
MD,s





PD <0 is possible. In other words, both irrelevance result and relevance result exist
depending on g and l. In private duopoly, an increasing in s stimulates production by both
ﬁrms; thereby government has a strong incentive for increasing s, and hence s
PD>s
MD even
large l exists. However, in mixed duopoly, a higher g reducesthe total outputsin mixed
duopoly, and government will need to provide a higher subsidy rate in order to stimulate
production and increase consumer surplus. Accordingly, when a public ﬁrm isprivatized,
government has to consider how to change the subsidy rate. When g iss mall (large), the
government should increase (decrease) the subsidy rate after privatization.
7
Proposition 1.W h e nc o ste ﬃciency gap is small (large), the government should increase
(decrease) the subsidy rate after privatization.
Even though we now know the relation of s
PD and s
MD, but the subsidy rate itself is still
not be the suﬃcient condition to explain the welfare eﬀect. To explore the welfare eﬀect, we
ﬁrst need to delineate the eﬀect of subsidization policy on the output, which is crucial to the
change of consumer surplus. From lemmas 1, 2, 3, and mixed oligopoly literature, we learn that
the impact of the policy parameter on ﬁrmsʼ reaction function isdi ﬀerent in mixed oligopoly
from pure oligopoly. Wang and Chen (2010) showed that the cost eﬃciency gap, g,p l a ya
crucial role on determining optimal outcomesin mixed oligopoly. Accordingly, we s tart
analyzing the total output in the presence of g and then show the change on social welfare.
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7 Asthe referee pointed out that s ince privatization isrelated to governmental reform, it might be di ﬃcult for
government to increase (decrease) the subsidy rate. In Tomaru and Wang (2010), we addressed such issue concerned by
the referee.


































Should the government implement subsidization to stimulate total production in mixed and
pure duopoly? We would like to use the reaction functions of the Cournot model in Figure 3
for exploring the eﬀect of subsidy in mixed market setting. It can be checked from the ﬁrst
order condition: in the event of post-privatization, all ﬁrmsʼ reaction function is linear with a
slope of ,1/3 and an imposition of the speciﬁc subsidy shifts two reaction functions to the
right, which increases total outputs, i.e. Q
PD. It is well recognized that the subsidy induces the
output-eﬀect, and reduces the under-production eﬀect in the pure Cournot oligopoly. However,
the under-production eﬀect is weak in the mixed oligopoly vis-á-vis pure oligopoly, and the
subsidy may not produce the output-eﬀect.
In the event of pre-privatization, the public ﬁrmʼs reaction function is linear with the slope
of ,(1+l)C(1+g). If g>l, the slope of public ﬁrmʼs reaction function should be ﬂatter than
the case of the pure duopoly. On the other hand, if g<l, the slope of public ﬁrmʼs reaction
function is steeper. Checking from the ﬁrst order condition, we see that the output subsidy
shifts the private ﬁrmʼs reaction function to the right, but shifts the public ﬁrmʼs reaction
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q0function to the left, which is shown in Figure 3. Bold real lines are the reaction functions of the
mixed duopoly with g=1a sw e l la sl=0. Bold dotted lines indicate the impact of the subsidy
on the reaction functions. Black circles are optimal outputs. In the case of g>l, after subsidy,
the amount of the reduction of q0 is less than the case of the bold lines, which is shown as
black triangularities. Consequently, the total outputs increase. Analogously, in the case of g<l,
after subsidy, the amount of the reduction of q0 is larger than the case of the bold lines, which
is shown as black stars. Thereby, the total outputs declines.














Ensuring the relationship between g and l is critical for the welfare comparison, we set
bW=W
MD,W























From equation (13), we see that the higher the cost eﬃciency gap is, the more welfare loss
in the mixed oligopoly; accordingly, the diﬀerence between two welfare measurements should
be augmented. But the impact of taxation burden alters the diﬀerence between two welfare
measurements. Due to the possible inverse impact from taxation burden, the output eﬀect from
eﬃciency gain may be oﬀset. Given that l>0, the government adopts higher subsidy rate to
increase consumer surplus, but the cost eﬃciency gap in production and higher subsidy rate
lead to more loss of welfare than the increase of consumer surplus. However, the welfare is
unchanged when the public ﬁrm and the private ﬁrm have the same eﬃciency. Given that g is
ﬁxed, W
MD<W
PD when no taxation burden is imposed, i.e. l=0; W
MD>W
PD when full taxation
burden exists, i.e. l=1. We have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For an imposition of an optimal subsidy rate, welfare may increase, decrease, or
remain unchanged with privatization, which depends on the level of the cost eﬃciency gap and
the taxation burden. However, it may be possible to raise welfare through privatization as long
as the eﬃciency gain prevails or no excess taxation burden exists.
This corollary casts doubts on White (1996) who showed that the same subsidy rate yields
the ﬁrst-best outcome in both mixed and private oligopoly in his Cournot setting (irrelevance
result). Studies on optimal subsidy in mixed oligopoly have gained attentions. A series of
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8 Because the policy implication of Eq. 14 is not signiﬁcant, the ﬁgure is not displayed. However, from the
numerical analysis,
dg ¯
dl>0.papers demonstrated that there are no consequences from privatization in a mixed oligopoly
when the government uses a subsidy to ensure ﬁrst best. Matsumura and Tomaru (2009)
considered excess tax burden in mixed duopoly and examine the optimal subsidy policy. They
demonstrated that privatization aﬀects both the optimal subsidy rate and the resulting welfare.
However, their study ignored the existence of a cost eﬃciency gap between public ﬁrm and
private ﬁrm, and conjectured when incorporation of such eﬀect, the result that privatization
reduces welfare does not hold. Utilizing quadratic cost function, cost asymmetry comes from
diﬀerent production scale, but cost eﬃciency gain that may exist after privatization. We
demonstrated that W
MD<W
PD is still valid without policy burden, when g>1a n dl=0. In the
case of g=1a n dl=0, we see that Whiteʼs conclusion still holds. Moreover, this proposition is
also diﬀerent from Proposition 1 of Matsumura and Tomaru (2009). They showed that the





In this paper, we assumed that privatization leads an eﬃciency gain as reduction in
production cost of the public ﬁrm in mixed duopoly. In the presence of the excess taxation
burden, we found that for an imposition of an optimal subsidy, welfare may increase, decrease,
or remain unchanged with privatization, which depends on the level of the cost eﬃciency gap
and the taxation burden. However, it may be possible to raise welfare through privatization as
long as the eﬃciency gain prevails or no excess taxation burden exists. Government sets higher
subsidy to stimulate ﬁrmsʼ production if the value of cost-diﬀerential is assured.
The brief review of past literature stated in the introduction pointed out that various factors
result in the relevance result, including the order of move (Fjell and Heywood, 2004; Kato and
Tomaru, 2007; Tomaru and Saito, 2010), partial privatized setting (Tomaru, 2006), and
diﬀerentiated oligopoly (Hashimzade et al. 2007) . What we argued here is that the
consideration of eﬃciency gap and taxation burden may change the validity of their results.
Acknowledging a negative sign of subsidy represents a kind of taxation, it is worth to see
that Mujumdar and Pal (1998) is highly related to White (1996). They explored the eﬀect of
indirect taxation in mixed oligopoly, but no cost-eﬃciency gap and taxation burden are
considered. Interestingly, they had some similar results as ours, but not the same. They
examined that ﬁrst, total output is unaﬀected by the imposition of or change in either tax.
However, in our paper, either cost-eﬃciency gap or taxation burden has inﬂuence on the ﬁrmʼs
reaction function. Thereby, the total output might be altered in taxation policy. Second, with an
increase in tax, the less eﬃcient (public) ﬁrm gains market share over the more eﬃcient
(private) ﬁrm. In our case, the implement of subsidy policy reduces ineﬃcient (public) ﬁrmʼs
market share but raise eﬃcient (private) ﬁrmʼs. Essentially, they stated that privatization can
increase both welfare and tax revenue. The result we obtained is not coincided with theirs. With
the speciﬁc condition, privatization is beneﬁcial for welfare: as long as the eﬃciency gain
prevails or no excess taxation burden exists, it is possible to raise welfare through privatization.
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